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ABSTRACT: Framing is widely acknowledged to be central to understanding how language constructs public 
controversies. This paper draws on framing-for-deliberation and framing-for-difference to develop principles for 
framing science communication. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Framing is widely acknowledged to be central to understanding how language constructs 
public controversies (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Studies in science communication often 
evaluate how the presentation of an issue can produce changes of opinion (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007), such as how framing climate change in terms of economic benefits 
(Leiserowitz, 2006), health concerns (Maibach, Nisbit, Baldwin, Akerlof, & Diao, 2011), or 
stewardship and religious values (Zia & Todd, 2010) appeal to particular audiences. Nisbet and 
Mooney (2007) argue more directly that scientists should learn to actively frame issues to 
“make information relevant to different audiences” (p. 56). Expecting resistance from 
scientists, they conclude,  
[S]ome readers may consider our proposals too Orwellian, preferring to safely stick to the facts . . . as 
unnatural as it might feel, in many cases, scientists should strategically avoid emphasizing the 
technical details of science when trying to defend it. (p. 56) 
Rather than dismissing framing as Orwellian, I consider framing an inherent aspect of 
communication and language use (Bubela et al., 2009; Robbins, 2001; Nisbet & Scheufele, 
2009). Even “sticking to the facts” is a particular way of framing a message—framing is 
inevitable. Nonetheless, skepticism of framing as unnatural or even manipulative points to the 
importance of developing ethical principles to guide framing of science communication.  
 Conventionally, framing in science communication is associated with studying how 
particular frames resonate with particular audiences (e.g., Anderson, 2009; Nisbet & Scheufele, 
2009). The effectiveness of a particular frame is based on its relevance; thus, science 
communicators should research the relevance of particular frames. Within this paradigm, the 
goal of frame analysis is to maximize persuasion and motivate greater interest in science issues 
(Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009). This approach has produced important insights about how to 
communicate with particular audiences about particular issues. When faced with a public 
controversy related to science, framing ought to consider more than just persuasion. Science      
communicators and scholars should also consider how different types of framing might enable 
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new types of talk and action to address public controversies rather than focusing exclusively on 
persuasion. This paper draws on framing-for-deliberation and framing-for-difference to 
develop normative principles for framing science communication. Framing-for-deliberation 
uses language to clarify the range of positions surround an issue so that citizens can better 
decide what they want to do (Friedman, 2008). Framing-for-difference enables a pluralism of 
perspectives, narrative styles, and forms of argument, including challenges to hegemonic 
cultural discourses (Walmsley, 2009). Together these perspectives offer democratic principles 
to guide ethical framing within public controversies related to science and technology. 
2. ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF FRAMING 
Framing has been developed in and applied by a broad range of academic disciplines, from 
sociology to political science, linguistics to communication, media studies to English. Rather 
than sort out the differences between these different traditions, this essay draws on the general 
concept of framing to argue for increased attention to how framing can help create the 
conditions for democratic deliberation.  
 Framing refers to how particular ways of constructing and presenting messages result in 
certain impacts rather than others. Framing can focus on word choice—creation science versus 
creationism, climate change versus global warming versus climate weirding—to understand 
how particular ways of naming the phenomena create different understandings of it. How a 
story is told can highlight some information more than others, resulting in a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, or treatment recommendation (Entman, 
1993). There is a long tradition within media studies of examining the impact of news frames, 
whether, for example, a science story is framed in terms of the validity of science, ambiguous 
cause and effects, or uncertain science and controversial science (Anderson, 2009). Social 
movement scholars attend to the use of collective action frames that help mobilize people to 
take action (Chong & Druckman, 2007). George Lakoff (2004) helped popularize the term 
with his book Don’t Think of an Elephant, which demonstrated the power of framing by 
invoking an image of an elephant despite the instruction not to do so. All of these traditions 
maintain that framing is central to how language constructs public controversies. Indeed, many 
empirical studies demonstrate how different frames can influence how people answer public 
opinion surveys or understand an issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007). 
 It is easy to imagine unethical framing practices. Science communicators should not be 
spin-doctors, using imaginative framing to deceive audiences. For example, Lakoff (2004) 
argues that Bush-era Republicans referred to environmental positions as being “clean,” 
“healthy,” and “safe” despite knowing that these terms were not accurate. Using deceptive 
language that evokes frames that speakers don’t really believe but the public approves of is 
unethical. But determining what counts as deception can, in practice, be dicey. A reasonable 
principle for determining accuracy (and in turn deception) might be that frames should be 
consistent with underlying science. Science communicators—scientists, science journalists, 
politicians, and even citizens—should talk in ways that do not contradict science. But this 
principle presumes a level of certainty about what counts as science not present in many public 
controversies (Collins & Evans, 2009). Frequently scientific consensus about an emerging 
issue comes well after policy decisions must be made. Moreover, slight changes in framing can 
imply relationships related to scientific knowledge yet present relationships without scientific 
proof. 
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 To better understand the difficulty of assessing what counts as spin and deception, we 
can consider a current controversy over framing: should extreme weather events be framed as 
impacts of climate change? Extreme weather events have long been associated with climate 
change. A newspaper article could, for example, say that climate change will create more 
problems, including bringing more storms and floods. This would be considered a valid 
science frame (Antilla, 2005). When framing shifts from a general argument that climate 
change may result in future extreme weather events to linking a specific event with climate 
change or arguing that current weather patterns were caused by climate change, things get 
dicey. Nonetheless, several advocacy groups advocate this framing since it can help connect 
local weather with climate. The advocacy group 350.org held a day of action designed to help 
“connect the dots” between extreme weather and climate change. They encouraged people to 
take pictures of damage from hurricanes, tornados, and more with large dots labeling the 
wreckage as climate change. Select media coverage over the past decade has suggested that 
extreme weather events are caused by climate change (Antilla, 2005; Carvalho & Burgess, 
2005). Social scientists have challenged these frames, arguing that there is not empirical proof 
that specific extreme weather events have been caused by climate change (e.g., Climate 
Change, 2013). Reviewing the literature on weather and climate change, Trenberth (2012) 
argues that no events are caused by climate change, but all events are affected by climate 
change due to fundamental changes in the environment. Nonetheless, he argues that asking 
whether an event is caused by climate change is the wrong question based on climate science. 
Attempting to moderate this controversy, the Union of Concerned Scientists (Ekwurzel, 2012) 
developed informational graphics that placed extreme weather events on a continuum from 
limited evidence of linking tornados and hurricanes with human-caused climate change to 
strong evidence linking climate change with coastal flooding and heat waves. Nonetheless, 
debates have persisted over what links can and should be made between extreme weather 
events and climate change. Given this controversy, what counts as spin? Is it unethical (or 
inaccurate) to invoke climate change in discussions about Hurricane Sandy? Is it okay to imply 
that the wreckage from coastal flooding or a forest fire in the western United States should 
motive citizens to curb climate change? Is the only problem attributing causality for particular 
results to climate change? 
 This framing controversy reveals two important lessons for the development of the 
ethics of framing. First, determining what counts as legitimate scientific evidence to justify a 
particular frame may be difficult to establish within an ongoing controversy. This is 
particularly true when we begin to parse the differences between causation and correlations, 
between projected trends and current pathways. Second, this controversy is about the accuracy 
of framing extreme weather events as climate change impacts. But it is also over the efficacy 
of using frames to achieve particular communication goals. Activists want to connect extreme 
weather with climate change because they believe that these connections will motivate people 
to push for political action on climate change. After all, individuals can see and experience 
extreme weather. Climate change is notoriously difficult for individuals to see and experience. 
Thus extreme weather events provide a prime opportunity for overcoming one of the 
fundamental challenges for communicating about climate change. In this case, the ultimate 
goal—mobilizing political action—warrants better rhetorical use of extreme weather events. 
On the other side, social scientists are concerned that misrepresenting science will undermine 
the credibility of arguments for climate change, confuse those who make decisions, and lead to 
poor decision making (Climate Change, 2013).  
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 Framing research demonstrates that language is not neutral. This in and of itself is not 
problematic. Yet framing obligates us to reflect on what we are trying to accomplish with 
language. Rather than focusing exclusively on developing standards for scientific accuracy, I 
argue that science communication ethics should include consideration of the goals that guide 
framing. In particular, I argue that democratic theory can provide useful principles for framing 
that enables public action.  
3. FRAMING FOR DEMOCRACY 
Often framing research and strategic framing by science communicators focuses on how 
framing can be used to aid persuasion. Here I use persuasion in the broad sense of the term, 
including language use to produce changes of opinion, language use to make information 
relevant to different audiences, and language use to mobilize people to advocate for particular 
policy actions. In all of these scenarios, frame alignment is a key element in nudging the public 
to support policies informed by science or tackle scientific controversies.  
 Within a vibrant public sphere, science communicators have many occasions when 
persuasion is necessary and appropriate for a variety of political and scientific goals. 
Nonetheless, I believe that framing-for-persuasion is insufficient for producing public action 
on some public controversies. First, focusing on persuasion can undermine trust with publics if 
people feel as though they are being manipulated or pressured into thinking a particular way 
(Bubela et al., 2009). Instead of seeing scientists as honest brokers (Pielke, 2007) who help lay 
out options, framing-for-persuasion marks science communicators as issue advocates. Whereas 
there are situations when science communicators adopt this role intentionally, there may be 
other moments when this role unnecessarily constrains science communicators. Second, 
framing-for-persuasion can be insufficient for producing public action. Focusing on how 
frames resonate with particular audiences can lead to increased audience segmentation and 
messaging to distinct audiences. The more that frames attempt to resonate with existing 
interpretative schema, the more that these frames may end up feeding political polarization and 
disagreement by associating science controversies with other politicized debates. Framing-for-
persuasion focuses on how to communicate to audiences without considering how framing 
might be used to get various groups to work together. Addressing public controversies often 
requires collective action that reaches across political and ideological divides. We need to 
know more about the impact of framing on active engagement (Moser, 2010). 
 Rather than focusing exclusively on framing-for-persuasion, science communicators 
should consider how framing can be used to accomplish democratic goals. If, as Nisbet and 
Scheufele (2009) argue, the future of science communication is facilitating conversations with 
the public that recognize, respect, and incorporate differences in knowledge, values, 
perspectives, and goals, we should consider what it means to frame for these sort of 
conversations. This is what I call framing for democracy. I use this general term because I 
believe that these sort of public conversations ought to have elements from two related models 
of democracy: deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism.  
 Deliberation foregrounds the importance of people coming together to consider an issue 
from multiple perspectives to weigh the trade-offs between different perspectives under 
conditions of respect and mutual consideration. Framing-for-deliberation means clarifying the 
range of positions surrounding an issue so that citizens can better decide what they want to do 
(Friendman, 2008). Framing-for-deliberation often involves exposing a group to multiple 
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frames for understanding a particular issue. For example, consider three distinct approaches to 
addressing climate change offered by a Public Agenda guide for citizen thought and action:  
(1) We need decisive local, national, and interactional action to prevent and minimize the 
worst consequences of climate change. 
(2) We need to make sure our most vulnerable communities adapt to the inevitable changes 
global warming will cause. 
(3) We should trust the free market to lead the way in the search for solutions. 
Each of these approaches frames climate change differently and suggests distinct strategies for 
addressing it. In framing-for-deliberation, participants would be exposed to not one but all 
three different approaches. Practically, this is equivalent to exposing participants to multiple 
contradictory frames. Empirical research shows that framing effects disappear when 
individuals understand the rationales for multiple frames (Druckman & Nelson, 2003). 
Framing-for-deliberation intentionally uses crosscutting interpersonal discussions and 
background materials to limit the framing effects of a single message and, instead, encourage 
individuals to come to considered judgment about an issue. 
 Agonistic pluralism is concerned that a singular focus on deliberation might quiet 
dissent and disensus that are essential to countering hegemonic power and perspectives within 
a democracy. Thus framing-for-difference entails enabling a pluralism of perspectives, 
including challenges to hegemonic cultural discourses (Walmsley, 2009). Framing-for-
difference is concerned with opening up the issue to ensure that ways of speaking and values 
are not marginalized. 
 Drawing on both framing-for-deliberation and framing-for-difference, framing for 
democracy requires some fundamental shifts in science communication goals and the 
corresponding framing strategies. Instead of researching the positive or negative valence of 
particular frames, framing for democracy would acknowledge multiple valid competing values 
and frames. The goal would not be to isolate the best frame to accomplish a particular goal. 
Instead, the goal would be to identify the set of frames that need to be considered together. 
Instead of either avoiding or fuelling public controversies, framing-for-deliberation would 
focus on coming to terms with them. This means that science communicators would aim to 
create the conditions to address a controversy through policy or cooperative action. Coming to 
terms with a public controversy does not necessarily mean solving the problem. Some wicked 
problems defy a singular solution and, instead, require adaptive management and governance. 
But framing for democracy would actively take on this governance. Instead of testing how 
citizens respond to frames produced by scholars or advocates, framing for democracy would 
also listen for how issues are already framed by citizens and consider how these frames might 
be used to frame science issues. In this respect, framing for democracy seeks opportunities for 
bottom-up framing, including bottom-up framing that challenges frames created by science 
communicators. 
 Framing for democracy may not be an appropriate goal for all science communicators. 
Meteorologists explaining the risks of an upcoming storm, for example, seek to raise 
awareness so that individuals take necessary precautions. This type of decision making is 
fundamentally different than the public controversies that call for democratic approaches. I am 
not suggesting that framing for democracy is the only appropriate goal for science 
communicators. Nonetheless, I would argue that we should not simply restrict this approach to 
deliberative practitioners who are organizing face-to-face deliberative forums and dialogues. 
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Museums can serve as sites for deliberative democracy when they provide information in a 
way that enables visitors to consider multiple interests and perspectives, weigh the strengths 
and weaknesses of arguments, engage in respectful discussion across viewpoints, and come to 
considered judgment (Camerson & Deslandes, 2011). Likewise, a deliberative system is held 
together by media that transmit information, play watchdog, and serve as public advocates 
(Dryzek, 2010; Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012). Thus framing for democracy has implications 
for a variety of science communicators who seek to enable collective decision making and 
action on public controversies related to science. 
4. A METHOD FOR FRAMING FOR DEMOCRACY 
Deliberation practitioners have been framing issues for democracy for over twenty years. Their 
experience provides some basic moves for accomplishing this sort of framing. Generally, 
framing refers to the communication processes structuring deliberation or democratic 
discussion, including definition and construction of the issue under deliberation, development 
of alternatives at stake, emphasizing some elements at the expense of others, and suggesting 
interpretive connections among certain ideas and symbols (Barisione, 2012). Generating these 
frames includes three basic moves. 
 First, framing for democracy starts with broad issue analysis in order to understand the 
nature of the problem. Fundamentally, democratic action relies on some shared understanding 
of the problem in order to provide traction for different people to come together and act. If 
people disagree about the nature of the problem (or do not recognize an issue as a problem), 
they often will struggle to come together to address the problem. In the United States, climate 
change has suffered from this problem as people focus on debating the existence of climate 
change rather than agreeing that climatic changes are themselves a problem. Within framing-
for-persuasion, communicators often generate new frames that each construct a distinct 
diagnosis of the problem. Instead, framing for democracy attempts to define a problem or 
constellation of problems in a way that broadly resonates with a community, and then consider 
this problem from multiple different perspectives.  
 Framing for democracy presumes that issues themselves are public in nature and 
require collective action. This means that issues are framed as public issues, not technical 
issues. Yet it attempts to avoid treating issues as “merely political,” denigrating politics to the 
messy business of tracking the whim of the public. As Moore (2010) observes, framing ethical 
questions such that some kinds of concerns appear legitimately ethical while others are merely 
political or transient matters of public concern can reproduce problems of experts’ domination 
by trivializing politics. When framing for democracy, science communicators should 
interrogate whether a particular issue requires public action. If not, then it should be framed as 
a technical issue and left to the appropriate experts. But if issues are deemed public, then they 
should be framed as public issues, and framing should enable meaningful public engagement 
with the issue. 
 Next, framing for democracy attempts to disentangle key elements of a complex 
problem in such a way that people from a wide variety of background and starting points are 
able to grapple with the shared problem or constellation of problems. The goal here is to 
provide sufficient detail for citizens to engage an issue without leaving them completely 
overwhelmed. Citizens do need to be “second-hand scientists” in order to deliberate about an 
issue (Kadlec, 2009). Instead, they need to be given key information that helps them get past 
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common misconceptions and a range of choices that are presented in non-technical language so 
that they can weigh the costs and trade-offs of possible approaches. 
 Finally, there is a general move away from binary framing, presenting an issue as all or 
nothing, us versus them, or a single yes or no decision. Often within a democracy issues are 
framed in terms of voting on a particular proposition. Initiatives, for example, have citizens 
vote yes or no on a proposed law. This issue framing generates advocates on both sides of an 
issue. Framing for democracy attempts to resist having two sides to an issue. Instead, issues are 
explored from multiple perspectives, including how various stakeholders might approach a 
particular topic. A simple way of avoiding binary thinking is to have more than two sides to an 
issue.  
 When framing for democracy, scientific information plays an essential role. Quality 
deliberation requires building a solid information base (Gastil, 2008). For scientific 
controversies, this means establishing shared understanding about the technical aspects of an 
issue. In order to make decisions about how to meet future water needs, for example, a 
community needs to be familiar with water law, basic hydrology, and current consumption 
rates.  
 Within framing for democracy, citizens must be able to challenge framing, including 
assumptions about science. In her analysis of British Columbia’s deliberation on bio banking, 
Walmsley (2009) notes that citizens challenged many of the fundamental assumptions held by 
the organizers who framed the event. Participants developed and embellished the figure of a 
“mad scientist” as a way to challenge the certainties promised by scientific, legal, and ethical 
expertise within the event. They questioned whether science can be governed and challenged 
the assumption that provincial governance is of any use at all. Moreover, they challenged the 
assumption that citizens are interested in democratizing science. All of these moves fulfill 
framing-for-difference by attending to how citizen participants challenge dominant framing, in 
this case by event organizers. 
5. CONCLUSION  
Within science communication, framing research and practice has tended to focus on framing-
for-persuasion. In this essay, I have argued for expanding this focus to framing for democracy. 
Framing for democracy provides principles for guiding ethical framing beyond solely focusing 
on the accuracy of frames by focusing on the overall communication goals. 
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